The UK government's COVID-19 policy: assessing evidence-informed policy analysis in real time by Cairney, Paul
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in British Politics. 
The definitive publisher-authenticated version Cairney P (Forthcoming) The UK 
government's COVID-19 policy: assessing evidence-informed policy analysis in real time. 




Paul Cairney p.a.cairney@stir.ac.uk  
Version accepted for British Politics 16.10.20 
The UK Government’s COVID-19 policy: assessing 
evidence-informed policy analysis in real time  
 
Abstract. In March 2020, COVID-19 prompted policy change in the UK at a speed and scale 
only seen during wartime. Throughout, UK government ministers emphasised their reliance on 
science and expertise to make the right choices at the right time, while their critics argued that 
ministers ignored key evidence and acted too little too late. Lessons from this debate should 
have a profound effect on future action, but only if based on a systematic analysis of 
policymaking as the problem emerged in real time. We should not confuse hindsight with 
foresight. To that end, I combine insights from policy analysis guides, policy theories, and 
critical policy analysis to frame this debate. The pandemic exposes the need to act despite high 
ambiguity and uncertainty and low government control, using trial-and-error strategies to adapt 
to new manifestations of the problem, and producing unequal consequences for social groups. 
Lessons will only have value if we incorporate these policymaking limitations and unequal 
socioeconomic effects and ask the right questions when holding the UK government to account.  
Introduction: how should we characterise the UK government response? 
On the 23rd March 2020, the UK Government’s Prime Minister Boris Johnson declared: ‘From 
this evening I must give the British people a very simple instruction – you must stay at home’ 
(Johnson, 2020a). He announced measures to help limit the impact of COVID-19, including 
new regulations on behaviour, police powers to support public health, budgetary measures to 
support businesses and workers during their economic inactivity, the almost-complete closure 
of schools, and the major expansion of healthcare capacity via investment in technology, 
discharge to care homes, and a consolidation of national, private, and new health service 
capacity. Devolved governments, responsible for public health in Northern Ireland, Scotland, 
and Wales, introduced very similar measures as part of a coordinated approach (although this 
article focuses on UK government policy only; see Paun et al, 2020 on four-nation 
developments). Overall, COVID-19 prompted almost-unprecedented policy change, towards 
state intervention, at a speed and magnitude that seemed unimaginable before 2020.  
Yet, many have criticised the UK government’s response as slow and insufficient, suggesting 
that we explain policy ‘blunders’ (Gaskell et al, 2020), learn lessons from more successful 
governments (Powell-King and Hill, 2020), and criticise UK ministers playing the ‘blame 
game’ with their advisors and delivery bodies (Boin et al, 2020; Oliver, 2020). Initial criticisms 
include that UK ministers did not: take COVID-19 seriously enough in relation to existing 
evidence (when its devastating effect was apparent in China in January and Italy from 
February); act as quickly as other countries to test for infection to limit its spread, and/ or 
introduce swift measures to close schools, businesses, and major social events, and regulate 




each other at events and in public transport (Henley, 2020). Some suggest that the UK 
government was responding to the ‘wrong pandemic’, assuming that COVID-19 could be 
treated like influenza (Pegg, 2020). Subsequent criticisms highlight problems in securing 
personal protective equipment (PPE), testing capacity, and an effective test-trace-and-isolate 
system, contributing to a ‘story of systematic failure’ (Gaskell et al, 2020: 7).  
Some critics blame UK ministers for pursuing a ‘mitigation’ strategy, allegedly based on 
reducing the rate of infection and impact of COVID-19 until the population developed ‘herd 
immunity’ (Kermani, 2020a), rather than an elimination strategy to minimise its spread until a 
vaccine could be developed (Sridhar, 2020; Cairney, 2021). Some criticise the over-reliance 
on models which underestimated the R (rate of transmission) and ‘doubling time’ of cases and 
contributed to a 2-week delay of lockdown (Yates, 2020; Taylor, 2020). Many describe this 
approach and delay, compounded by insufficient PPE in hospitals and fatal errors in the 
treatment of care homes, as the biggest contributor to the UK’s high number of excess deaths 
(Campbell et al, 2020; Burn-Murdoch and Giles, 2020; Scally et al, 2020; Mason, 2020; Ball, 
2020; compare with Freedman, 2020a; 2020b and Snowdon, 2020). 
In contrast, scientific advisers to UK ministers have emphasised the need to gather evidence 
continuously to model the epidemic and identify key points at which to intervene, to reduce the 
size of the peak of population illness initially, then manage the spread of the virus over the 
longer term (e.g. Vallance on Sky News, 2020). Throughout, they emphasised the need for 
individual behavioural change (hand washing and social distancing), supplemented by 
government action, in a liberal democracy in which direct imposition is unusual and 
unsustainable (Johnson, 2020b).  
We can relate these contemporary debates on UK government capacity and performance to 
established policy research on the general limits to policymaking (summarised in Cairney, 
2016; 2020a; Cairney et al, 2019) which underpins the ‘governance thesis’ and academic study 
of British politics (Kerr and Kettell, 2006: 11; Jordan and Cairney, 2013: 234): 
1. Policymakers must ignore almost all evidence.  
2. Policymakers have a limited understanding, and even less control, of their 
policymaking environments.  
3. Even though they lack full knowledge and control, governments must still make 
choices.  
4. Their choices produce unequal impacts on different social groups.  
These insights contradict the image of British politics associated with the ‘Westminster model’: 
the idea that policy is controlled by a small number of UK government ministers, with the 
power to solve major policy problems, remains popular in media and public debate but provides 
a wildly misleading way to assess policy outcomes (Cairney, 2020c). 
To make better sense of current developments, we need to (a) understand how UK government 
policymakers address these limitations in practice, and (b) widen the scope of debate to 
consider the impact of policy on inequalities. A policy theory-informed and real-time account 
helps us avoid after-the-fact wisdom and bad-faith trials by social media. UK government 
action has been deficient in important ways, but we need careful and systematic analysis to 




account, from (a) a naïve and partisan rush to judgement that undermines learning and lets 
ministers off the hook. 
To that end, I combine insights from policy analysis guides, policy theories, and critical policy 
analysis to analyse the UK government’s initial COVID-19 policy (the first half of 2020). I use 
the lens of 5-step policy analysis models to identify what analysts and policymakers need to 
do, the limits to their ability to do it, and the distributional consequences of their choices. I 
focus on sources in the public record, including oral evidence to the House of Commons Health 
and Social Care committee, and the minutes and meeting papers of the UK Government’s 
Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), transcripts of TV press conferences and 
radio interviews, and reports by professional bodies and think tanks. To address an overload of 
information, I summarise the argument here and link to a full account of these sources in online 
annexes (Cairney, 2020d-2020l, found here https://paulcairney.wordpress.com/covid-19/). 
Three ways to think about evidence-informed policy advice  
Policy analysis guidebooks identify what analysts and policymakers need to do (their 
functional requirements). Policy theories gauge their ability to do it (their actual capacity). 
Critical policy analysis reveals the contested nature of advisor-informed policy, in which there 
is unequal access to influence and policy has an unequal impact. Combined, these approaches 
help to assess how the UK government has: used evidence selectively, modified its approach, 
limited the scope of policy-relevant advice, and proposed solutions with unequal consequences 
on the UK population.  
Policy analysis texts recommend pragmatic ways to ‘do’ analysis, based on the assumption that 
one organisation conducts all steps on behalf of a client:  
1. Define a policy problem identified by your client. 
2. Gather evidence efficiently to identify technically and politically feasible solutions. 
3. Use value-based criteria and political goals to compare solutions. 
4. Predict the outcome of each solution. 
5. Make a concise recommendation to your client (Bardach and Patashnik, 2020; 
Dunn, 2017; Meltzer and Schwartz, 2019; Mintrom, 2012; Weimer and Vining, 
2017).  
 
Modern advice reflects a new story about policy analysis: it once resembled a club with elite 
analysts inside government giving technical advice about policy, but now there are many 
analysts inside and outside of government, competing to define problems and assign value to 
their evidence and solutions (Radin, 2019; Brans et al, 2017; Enserink et al, 2013). This story 
should go further to explain two key dynamics.  
First, policymakers must find ways to deal with their limited knowledge and control. They use 
two cognitive shortcuts: ‘rational’ (using well-established rules to identify high quality sources 
of information) and ‘irrational’ (using gut instinct, emotion, and beliefs) (Cairney and 
Kwiatkowski, 2017). They define a problem, seek information that is available, 
understandable, and actionable, and identify credible sources of advice. Their choice of experts 
relates strongly to how they define the problem. These dynamics take place in a policymaking 
environment in which no single ‘centre’ has the power to turn advice into outcomes (Cairney 




policy is made or delivered in many venues, with their own rules and networks, over which 
senior elected policymakers have limited knowledge and influence. Factors such as social and 
economic conditions and events are also largely out of their control.  
Second, policymakers must still act despite their limited knowledge and control, and each 
choice has an unequal impact on populations. All policy analysis steps are subject to 
contestation, in which actors compete to determine: how to define problems in a way that 
assigns blame to some and support to others (Bacchi, 2009); whose evidence counts (Smith, 
2012; Doucet, 2019); who should interpret and prioritise political values, (Stone, 2012), and if 
new solutions should challenge a status quo that harms marginalised populations (Michener, 
2019; Schneider and Ingram, 1997).  
Table 1 identifies the policy analysis steps associated with ‘how to’ guides, then uses policy 
process and critical approaches to widen discussion. This approach provides different 
standards to assess the substance and direction of government policy. It highlights the need to 
consider how (1) the expert analysis of policy problems relates to (2) the cognitive and 
environmental limits to policy analysis and action, and (3) whose knowledge counts as policy-
relevant, and whose interests determine the final outcome. 
Table 1 Three perspectives on 5-step policy analysis  
 Policy analysis texts Policy process research Critical policy analysis 
Step 1 Define a policy 
problem identified 
by your client 
Incorporate a policymaker’s 
willingness and ability to 
understand and solve the 
policy problem 
Challenge dominant ways 
to frame issues  
 
Step 2 Identify technically 
and politically 
feasible solutions 
Identify the mix of policy 
instruments already being 
used, and why  
Use inclusive ways to 
generate knowledge and 
perspectives on solutions 
Step 3 Use values and 
political goals to 
compare solutions 
Identify how actors 
cooperate or compete to 
define and rank values. 
Co-produce the rules to 
produce and evaluate 
solutions 
Step 4 Predict the outcome 
of each feasible 
solution 
Emphasise uncertainty 
about the disproportionate 
effect of your solution on 
the existing policy mix  
Identify the impact on 
marginalised groups, such 








Recommend how to adapt to 
policymaking systems. In 
the absence of certainty, 
how often do you act? In the 
absence of centralisation, 




many stakeholders, to make 
sure that you anticipate and 
respect their reaction to 
your proposals  
Source: adapted from Cairney (2020b).  
Multiple perspectives on UK government COVID-19 policy  
These perspectives are crucial to the analysis of UK government COVID-19 policy. First, they 
help reinterpret UK ministerial rhetoric on being ‘guided by the science’ (Cairney and 
Wellstead, 2020). This rhetoric conjures the idea of ‘rational’ policy analysis within a single 




experts are relevant and how to save some people and let others die. Second, they highlight 
conflicting drivers of policy analysis from policy process research and critical perspectives. 
The former highlights the value of pragmatic policy analysis. The latter suggests that 
pragmatism reinforces the status quo and social inequalities (Cairney, 2020b). In that context, 
the following sections use the three perspectives on 5-step policy analysis structure (Table 1) 
to interpret COVID-19 policy.  
Step 1. Define the problem, what is possible, and who is important 
COVID-19 as a physical problem is not the same as a policy problem (Cairney, 2021). To 
define the former is to identify the physical impact on individuals and populations of a virus 
and disease (WHO, 2020). To define the latter, actors relate the physical problem to what they 
think a government can, and should, do about it.  
Policy analysis: define the problem 
Policy analysis advice emphasises the need to combine rhetoric and data to frame a problem’s 
severity, urgency, and cause, and the role of government in solving it (Cairney 2020b). This 
combination is reflected in descriptions in March by scientific advisors interviewed by TV and 
print media (e.g. BBC Newsnight, 2020), and in SAGE minutes and meeting papers and oral 
evidence to the Health and Social Care committee (Cairney, 2020d; 2020e). They describe the 
problem as follows: there will be an epidemic, then the problem will be endemic (perhaps like 
seasonal flu); in the absence of a vaccine, the only way to produce ‘herd immunity’ is for most 
people to be infected and recover; we need some way to shield the most vulnerable during its 
spread; the epidemic may only seem real to most people when people begin to die; and, the 
power of government to control spread is limited, and many actions could have unintended 
consequences. In that context, they relate possible solutions to reducing the initial peak of 
infection rather than eliminating the virus:   
• Contain the virus enough to make sure it spreads at the right speed, to make sure that 
healthcare capacity is not overwhelmed (based on a ‘reasonable worst case scenario’: 
11% of people with symptoms requiring hospital treatment of at least 8 days, and 1-2% 
requiring invasive ventilation treatment and intensive care – SAGE meeting 11, 27.2.20 
in Cairney, 2020e: 6-7).  
• Encourage people to change their behaviour, to look after themselves (e.g. 
by handwashing) and forsake their individual preferences for the sake of public 
health (e.g. by keeping a two-metre-minimum distance from people, and self-isolating 
if feeling symptoms). 
Such accounts informed how the UK government defined the policy problem and timing of 
intervention. For example, the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team (2020) engaged in 
framing to (a) predict the spread of the virus and its impact on population illness and mortality, 
(b) warn against insufficient intervention, (c) identify different forms of intervention, and (d) 
rule some options out (including no action and elimination): 
1. Its ‘unmitigated epidemic scenario’ describes ‘the (unlikely) absence of any control 
measures or spontaneous changes in individual behaviour’, and predicts 510,000 deaths 
in the UK in 2020 (2020: 7).      
2. Its ‘mitigation strategy scenarios’ highlight the relative effects of partly-voluntary 




• voluntary ‘case isolation in the home’ (people with symptoms stay at home for 7 days) 
• ‘voluntary home quarantine’ (all members of the household stay at home for 14 days if 
one member has symptoms) 
• government enforced ‘social distancing of those over 70’ or ‘social distancing of entire 
population’ (while still going to work, school or University) 
• closure of most schools and universities.  
• It omits ‘stopping mass gatherings’ because ‘the contact-time at such events is 
relatively small’ (2020a: 8).  
• Assuming 70-75% compliance, it describes the combination of ‘case isolation, home 
quarantine and social distancing of those aged over 70’ as the most impactful, but 
predicts that ‘mitigation is unlikely to be a viable option without overwhelming 
healthcare systems’ (2020a: 8-10). These measures would ‘reduce peak critical care 
demand by two-thirds and halve the number of deaths’ (to approximately 250,000).  
3. Its ‘suppression strategy scenarios’ describe what it would take to reduce the rate of 
transmission of infection (R) from the estimated 2.0-2.6 to 1 or below. A combination 
of ‘case isolation’, ‘social distancing of the entire population’ (the measure with the 
largest impact), ‘household quarantine’ and ‘school and university closure’ would 
reduce critical care demand from its peak ‘approximately 3 weeks after the 
interventions are introduced’, and contribute to a range of 5,600-48,000 deaths over 
two years (2020: 13-14).  
It argues that ‘epidemic suppression is the only viable strategy at the current time’, and these 
measures may be required until an effective vaccine or treatment is found (2020: 16).  
Policy process research: define what is possible 
Policy research prompts us to incorporate, in problem definition, a policymaker’s willingness 
and ability to understand and solve the problem. Put simply, policymakers (a) do not know 
exactly what is happening or what will be the impact of their actions, and (b) are unsure about 
how to regulate behaviour. For example, the amount of force necessary to change social 
behaviour radically would be too much for a government to consider in a liberal democracy. If 
so, the UK government’s definition of the policy problem will incorporate this implicit 
question: what can we do if (a) we can only influence how people will behave, and (b) we can 
only manage the spread of disease?  
There is some debate about the extent to which science advisors had to fit their advice into a 
narrative acceptable to ministers, or if their concerns were downplayed by ministers (Kermani, 
2020b; Snowdon, 2020). Regardless, most accounts suggest that a shift from exhortation to 
direct regulation did not seem technically or politically feasible to ministers (Calvert et al, 
2020) or many scientific advisors (Grey and MacAskill, 2020; Freedman, 2020a; 2020b). 
Ministers only accepted in mid-March the need to act more quickly and intensely. The COVID-
19 Response Team (2020a: 16) describes conclusions ‘reached in the last few days’ based on 
the lockdown experience in Italy and information from the NHS on ‘the limits to hospital surge 
capacity’. Before the UK lockdown of March 23rd, there is no mention in SAGE minutes that 
it is likely (Cairney, 2020e). 
Rather, early ministerial and scientific adviser messages related to two beliefs (Cairney, 2021). 
First, we can influence social behaviour somewhat by communicating effectively. For example, 




‘personal responsibility and responsibility to others’, emphasizing transparency, honesty, 
clarity, and respect, to maintain high trust in government and promote a sense of community 
action (‘we are all in this together’) (Meeting paper 25.2.20 in Cairney, 2020e: 5). Second, we 
can influence the distribution of the epidemic to avoid overwhelming health services and 
repeated waves of infection. SAGE minutes and meeting papers stress the need to (a) introduce 
isolation and social distancing measures to reduce the rate of transmission, but (b) avoid 
excessive suppressive measures on the first peak that would contribute to a second. 
Critical policy analysis: identify who is important 
Critical accounts encourage us to challenge the dominant frames which discriminate against 
the powerless (Bacchi, 2009; Stone, 2012). They relate to: who receives disproportionately 
positive/ negative and high/low attention, and the distributional consequences, such as when 
rhetoric about coronavirus being a ‘great leveller’ reduced attention to inequalities (Aiken, 
2020).   
This approach connects to studies of health equity which treat health as a human right and 
oppose the unfair distribution of health inequalities (Helsinki Statement on Health in All 
Policies, 2013).  The WHO (2020) defines the ‘social determinants of health’ as ‘the unfair and 
avoidable differences in health status … shaped by the distribution of money, power and 
resources [and] the conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age’. Whitehead 
and Dahlgren (2006: 4) argue that ‘all systematic differences in health between different 
socioeconomic groups within a country’ are unfair and avoidable, relating to environments 
rather than individual choices.  This approach challenges a tendency to relate health inequalities 
to ‘lifestyles’. The biggest impacts on population health come from (a) environments outside 
of an individual’s control (e.g. threats from others, such as pollution or violence), (b) education 
and employment, and (c) economic inequality, influencing access to warm and safe housing, 
high quality water and nutrition, transport, and safe and healthy environments (Solar and 
Urwin, 2010: 6; Bhala et al, 2020).  In that context, COVID-19 highlights stark examples of 
inequalities in relation to: 
Income and wealth. Some people can stockpile food and medicine, own homes to self-isolate 
and work, and access places to exercise. Many have insufficient access to food and medical 
supplies, few places to go outside, juggle caring and work responsibilities at home, or risk 
travelling to work to maintain low paid jobs. 
Gender. The lockdown and school closures exacerbate inequalities, in which women and girls 
are relatively vulnerable to domestic abuse (Home Affairs Select Committee, 2020; Moreira, 
2020), and caring responsibilities are skewed towards women (Close the Gap, 2020). Access 
to abortion services is more difficult (McDonald, 2020). Women in sex work are vulnerable to 
illness and assault (BBC News, 2020b). 
Race and ethnicity. Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic (BAME) populations are more 
vulnerable to COVID-19 related illness and death (Public Health England, 2020), particularly 
among NHS staff (Taiwo Owatemi MP 14.5.20: q99 in Cairney, 2020h).   
Age. Older people are more vulnerable to COVID-19 related death, more affected by limited 
access to hospital care, and people living with dementia in care homes are isolated (Office for 




Disability. Tidball et al (2020) describe the unusually high vulnerability to COVID-19 illness 
and death among people with disabilities and a reduction of social services.  
Mental health. ‘Mental ill health is a major cause and indicator of health inequality’ (Cairney 
and St Denny, 2020: 156), since social determinants contribute to inequalities of mental illness, 
and ‘people with mental illness die on average fifteen to twenty years earlier than those 
without’ (Chief Medical Officer, 2014: 12, 217). ‘Social distancing’ can exacerbate mental 
health problems while access to services is diminished (Cairney, 2020i).  
These inequalities intersect with each other, such as when:  
• BAME populations are more likely to be in housing not conducive to self-isolation, use 
public transport, work outside the home, and perform key worker jobs without 
sufficient protection (Keval, 2020).  
• Men account for 2/3 of COVID-19 deaths (Office for National Statistics, 2020b). Of 
the 17 occupations with higher death rates in men, 11 have high ‘proportions of workers 
from Black and Asian ethnic backgrounds’ (2020b).  
• Women are more likely to combine work and caring responsibilities, fulfil many key 
worker roles that make people more vulnerable to infection (such as supermarket and 
cleaning work, nursing and social care) and less able to find suitable PPE, while 
‘financial dependence and poverty’ exacerbate their vulnerability to domestic violence 
(Close the Gap, 2020).  
• The economic crisis exacerbates poverty which contributes to housing precarity and 
long-term problems with mental and physical health (Banks et al, 2020). Migrant 
workers often have ‘no recourse to public funds’ and face low wages, unsafe working 
conditions, and low ability to isolate safely (Clark et al, 2020).  Disabled BAME women 
are relatively unable to secure support (Women’s Budget Group, 2020). 
So, what exactly is the policy problem? 
These three perspectives help us develop a detailed picture of the UK Government’s problem 
definition by mid-March 2020:  
1. We are responding to an epidemic that cannot be eradicated.  
2. We need to use a suppression strategy to reduce infection enough to avoid 
overwhelming health service capacity, and shield the most vulnerable people, to 
minimize deaths during at least one peak of infection. 
3. We need to maintain suppression for a duration that is difficult to predict, subject to 
compliance levels that are difficult to monitor. 
4. We need to avoid panicking the public in the lead up to suppression, and maintain wide 
public trust in the government. 
5. We need to avoid (a) excessive and (b) insufficient suppression measures, which could 
contribute to a second wave of the epidemic (Vallance, 2020).   
6. We need to transition from suppression measures without allowing a major rise in R 
(the ‘exit strategy’), to ‘keep the economy growing’ (Johnson, 2020b), find safe ways 
for people to return to work and education, and reinstate NHS capacity. This strategy 
involves social distancing and (voluntary) track-and-trace measures to isolate people. 




It is almost impossible to sum up the problem concisely and comprehensively, and its 
ambiguity undermines a single coherent response. 
Step 2. Identify feasible solutions and their impact on existing policy and 
marginalized populations 
Policy ‘solutions’ are better described as ‘tools’ or ‘instruments’ because (a) they do not solve 
a problem, and (b) governments combine many instruments (Cairney, 2020a: 20-22; Hood and 
Margetts, 2007). Analysing their use help us provide a narrative of: economic models, including 
choices on public expenditure, tax, economic incentives, and the balance between the state and 
market; models of public service provision; and ways to influence individual and social 
behaviour, including formal regulations and legal sanctions versus spending, public education, 
exhortation, voluntary agreements, and behavioural public policies (John, 2011). They help us 
gauge commitment to policy change, from a minimalist focus on exhortation, to a maximalist 
focus on the redistribution of resources, provision of state services, and direct regulation of 
behaviour. In that context, we can identify two phases of intervention, from: 
1. exhortation to modify behaviour, coupled with the desire to maintain existing ways of 
social and economic life, to 
2. direct regulation and imposition, coupled with an unprecedented collection of measures 
to address the social and economic consequences.  
Policy analysis: identify technically and politically feasible solutions  
Policy analysis advice emphasises the need to identify only the solutions that your audience or 
client might consider (Cairney 2020b). There is a gap between technical and political 
feasibility: popular solutions may not work as intended if implemented, and technically feasible 
solutions often receive the least support (Lowi, 1964).  
This insight helps explain the initial UK approach, based on the putative benefits of exhortation 
and the gradual introduction of more ambitious measures. Initially, it focused on ensuring that 
the greatest action took place at the right time in relation to the peak of infection. It began with 
exhortation, emphasising effective handwashing, to stay a safe distance from other people, and 
to stay at home if experiencing COVID-19 symptoms.  On the 13th March, the UK 
Government’s Chief Scientific Advisor, Sir Patrick Vallance, described voluntary self-
isolation measures as ‘a big change … with the biggest impact at the moment’, then signalled 
the future need for whole household isolation, and emphasised that more stringent measures 
(such as to protect older and more vulnerable people) would ‘go on for weeks’ to coincide with 
the peak of infection. Forthcoming measures such as schools closures would have to last for 
months to be effective, and halting mass gatherings would have a relatively small impact (and 
unintended consequences) in the absence of a major suppression strategy (BBC News 2020a; 
Vallance, 2020). On the 16th March, the Prime Minister announced the need for: (1) all 
members of the household to stay at home for 14 days if one member has symptoms, (2) ‘people 
to start working from home where they possibly can’, and ‘avoid pubs, clubs, theatres and other 
such social venues’, (3) ‘those with the most serious health conditions’ to be ‘largely shielded 
from social contact for around 12 weeks’, and (4) the removal of emergency service support 
for large social gatherings (Johnson, 2020b). Further, SAGE ruled out many solutions as low 
impact, such as the routine screening of people flying into the UK (SAGE meetings 1-4, 




The Prime Minister’s speech on the 23rd March signals a major shift in policy. Johnson (2020a) 
combines:  
1. A statement on allowable behaviour. ‘People will only be allowed to leave their home 
for the following very limited purposes: shopping for basic necessities, as infrequently 
as possible; one form of exercise a day - for example a run, walk, or cycle - alone or 
with members of your household; any medical need, to provide care or to help a 
vulnerable person; and travelling to and from work, but only where this is absolutely 
necessary and cannot be done from home’. 
2. A signal of enforcement. ‘If you don’t follow the rules the police will have the powers 
to enforce them’. 
The UK government related such action to the general public good and vulnerable people, 
before stressing the impact of COVID-19 on NHS capacity and staffing: ‘Stay Home, Protect 
the NHS, Save Lives’ (Hope and Dixon, 2020).  
It introduced an unprecedented amount of measures to support radical policy change. Table 2 
summarises initial measures, focusing on UK Government public health action for England 
(devolved governments in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales are responsible for most 
aspects of public health - Paun et al, 2020) and economic policy for the UK. 
Table 2: Examples of initial UK policy changes, by category of policy instrument 
Policy instrument COVID-19 policies 
Regulations and legal 
sanctions 
Obliging people to stay at home, prohibiting social gathering, 
and closing most indoor public places (backed by police 
powers to disperse crowds and close premises, but focusing on 
warnings and fines) 
Formal regulations versus 
voluntary agreements 
A shift from encouraging to making indoor businesses close 
Public expenditure and 
borrowing 
Unprecedented employment ‘furlough’ schemes, plus 
increases in social security  and business support 
Tax expenditure Deferred VAT payments by business and self-assessed income 
tax. Continued tax credits without further assessment 
Linking benefit entitlement 
to behaviour 
Postponed assessments (fitness to work, and proof of job-
seeking) and job centre appointments (which determine 
eligibility to social security payments) and benefit recovery 
Public services provision Major additional spending on public services such as the NHS, 
coupled with emergency measures to boost recruitment. 
Closure of childcare, school, and further and higher education 
(or shift to online provision) 
Public education  To publicise messages on hand-washing and social distancing 
Behavioural public policy To encourage behaviour, such as handwashing, and support the 
introduction then relaxation of regulations on social distancing 
Organisational change, and 
additional resources to help 
change behaviour 
The establishment (from June) of a new Test and Trace system 
(contact tracing and isolation, manually and via a proposed 
new app), and the Joint Biosecurity Centre (JBC) to coordinate 
data, respond to local outbreaks (clusters/ super-spreaders), 
and develop Alert Levels. Both measures are described as 
supporting the easing of lockdown measures, when the R in the 




Funding scientific research 
and 
commissioning reviews 
£250m announced to fund vaccine research 
Public Health England (PHE) research on the disproportionate 
impact of COVID-19 on BAME populations. 
 
The most radical temporary policy change relates to legislation - the Coronavirus Act 2020 
(25.3.20) and additional statutory instruments - to regulate behaviour. Every entry in the 
following list would normally qualify as a major policy change in its own right, to: 
1. Regulate social and business behaviour  
• Oblige people to stay at home in the absence of a reasonable excuse or exceptions (to 
work if you cannot work at home, pick up essential food or medicine, access essential 
public services, and/ or exercise outdoors). 
• Prohibit almost all gatherings of more than two people.  
• Oblige the closure of businesses - including bars, cinemas, theatres, bingo and concert 
halls, fitness centres, and museums – and reserve the right to close childcare services 
(schools had closed on 20.3.20). 
• Enable police powers to enforce the measures through fines (or arrests) for non-
compliance. 
2. Boost public service recruitment by changing the rules to register many NHS and social 
work staff (Department of Health and Social Care, 2020).  
3. Reduce the safeguards on detaining someone with reference to their mental health or 
capacity. 
4. Modify rules on medical negligence, discharge, the registration of deaths, the disposal 
of bodies, inquests, and who can provide vaccinations to patients. 
5. Modify rules on judicial commission appointments, the retention of fingerprint and 
DNA data, online court proceedings, postpone the completion of community service, 
and provide more scope for early prison release. 
6. Give the UK government powers to compel private companies to provide information 
on the food supply. 
7. Postpone national and local elections. 
8. Protect people from eviction, and businesses from lease forfeiture (Ministry of 
Housing, Communities & Local Government, 2020). 
The most radical long-term change relates to public spending and borrowing. The Office for 
Budget Responsibility (OBR, 2020a) estimated spending at £123 billion, revised upwards to 
£132.6 (2020b). It includes spending on public services, charities, and local authority schemes 
(£17.3bn), additional social security payments (£8bn), a ‘coronavirus job retention scheme’ in 
which the government pays 80% of the salary of ‘furloughed’ staff in the public and private 
sector (net £54bn) for  8 months, the equivalent scheme for the self-employed (£15bn), tax 
reliefs, grants, and loans to businesses (£33bn), and deferred Value Added Tax and self-
assessed income tax (£3.1bn). These changes grew as the size of the economic problem grew, 
in relation to public pressure (for example, to extend free school meal provision over summer), 
and to address a longer-term problem than expected (HM Treasury and Sunak, 2020). 
These changes were supported by the ability to borrow over the long term at low interest rates. 
The UK ‘government gross debt was ‘£1,891.8 billion at the end of 2019, equivalent to 85.4% 




Emmerson and Stockton (2020) describe the £123bn package as ‘unprecedented’ and 
borrowing as ‘the largest share of national income in peacetime’.  
Policy process research: identify the impact of new instruments on the policy mix  
It is difficult to define ‘COVID-19 policy’ because: each new instrument adds to a pile of 
measures and intersects with others; a commitment to policy change does not ensure its 
delivery; its implementation does not ensure its intended outcome; policy often made as it is 
delivered; and, there are always unintended consequences (Cairney, 2020a). Rapid policy 
change on paper lacks meaning without evidence of outcomes.  
First, legislation on social regulation relates imperfectly to (a) outputs such as police capacity 
devoted to encouraging compliance and (b) outcomes such as infection rates. The amount of 
time that the UK government is willing and able to maintain its regulations is uncertain, and 
there is no reliable knowledge of compliance. For example, SAGE minutes and meeting papers 
describe: 
1. Their inability to measure the impact (on R) of each measure, because their data is 
limited and lockdown measures were introduced at the same time (meeting 25, 14.4.20 
in Cairney, 2020d: 50). 
2. Their inability to estimate the impact of relaxing each measure (meeting 31, 1.5.20 in 
Cairney, 2020d: 57). 
3. Uncertainty about the transition from national lockdown to location-specific measures 
(meeting 28 minutes/papers, 23.4.20 in Cairney, 2020d: 53-4). 
4. Minimal knowledge on virus transmission in ‘forgotten institutional settings’ and 
behaviour among vulnerable ‘hard to reach groups’ (meeting 39 minutes/papers, 
28.5.20 in Cairney, 2020d: 67-8). 
5. Continuous uncertainty about issues such as ‘the general public wearing facemasks as 
a preventative measure’ (4.2.20: 3; 14.4.20: 2; 21.4.20 in Cairney, 2020d: 49-52; 
compare with Greenhalgh et al, 2020). This uncertainty informed weak UK government 
advice on their public use (Cabinet Office, 2020).  
Second, while the economic package is large, its impact is unclear. The OBR’s (2020b) revised 
estimate highlights uncertainty about who would need help. The ‘job retention scheme’ cost a 
lot less than expected, ‘reflecting the apparent concentration of furloughing among part-time 
and lower-paid jobs’, and was a stopgap without a clear ‘exit strategy’ (Portes and Wilson, 
2020). There are similar examples of action-without-known-consequences in other sectors (e.g. 
Home Office, 2020a; 2020b action on domestic violence or modern slavery).  
Third, the limitations to, and unintended consequences of, policy have contributed to many 
deaths in health and social care. The inadequate stockpile and supply of PPE, for NHS and 
other staff, is a constant feature of oral evidence to the Health and Social Care committee 
(Cairney, 2020j), and worryingly-high levels of hospital infection is a regular feature of SAGE 
meetings (Cairney, 2020e). Inadequate testing capacity is a routine feature in both venues, 
suggesting that more data would have informed more accurate modelling, and more diagnostic 
capacity outside of hospital settings would have aided early containment and contact tracing 
(Cairney, 2020k; 2020e). The UK government responded by setting a target on COVID-19 




In the meantime, the lack of testing and PPE combined with other policies to contribute to a 
crisis of deaths in care homes. A high priority for NHS England was to maximise hospital 
capacity in the run up to a peak of infection. It pursued an initial target of 15000 discharges 
from hospital beds, primarily to care homes, without routine testing or quarantine measures, 
and redeployed medical and nursing care from care homes. The National Audit Office (2020) 
reports 25000 discharges, with testing limited to people with symptoms (17 March to 15 April), 
and a 30000 testing cap in care homes at the end of April. The Office for National Statistics 
(2020a; 2020d; 2020e) estimates (in different ways): at least one confirmed COVID-19 test in 
56% of care homes in England; 17,478 COVID-19-related deaths (in a care home or hospital) 
of all care home residents in England (27% of relevant deaths recorded up to 12th June); and, 
12,327 deaths in care homes in England, or a quarter of the 47,705 overall deaths recorded in 
England (up to 3rd July). 
Fourth, the UK government oversees, but does not seek to control precisely, health ‘quangos’ 
such as NHS England and agencies such as Public Health England (Ham, 2018; Boswell et al, 
2019). This relationship is double-edged, undermining direct control of policy delivery but 
allowing some blame deflection (symbolised by Health Secretary’s proposed abolition of PHE 
in August – Dixon, 2020). 
Critical policy analysis: use inclusive ways to generate solutions  
Policy requires a combination of evidence and values, to determine whose knowledge is 
valuable and who should benefit from policy. Yet, during crises such as pandemics, 
policymakers argue that they are primarily engaged in ‘evidence-based policymaking’, to 
assure the public that the government is in control (Cairney, 2016; Weible et al, 2020). Phrases 
such as ‘following the science’ are misleading (Stevens, A, 2020) and exclusionary. They 
symbolise a style of policymaking designed to be centralised (to project ministerial control) 
and insulated (to limit participation to a small number of experts), which undermines the wider 
‘co-production’ of policy (Durose et al, 2017). Consequently, many changes to policy in 
practice are only visible when people raise concerns, including: 
• Reinforcing economic inequalities. Alves and Sial (2020) note that the UK budget 
package reinforces economic inequalities. It supports businesses via direct support and 
wage schemes rather than households, while maintaining ‘unequal distribution’ and 
failing to protect the most vulnerable. 
• Reinforcing inequalities relating to disability. Disability Rights UK and Liberty (2020) 
criticise the loss of rights to care that are ostensibly guaranteed in the Care Act.  
• Reinforcing inequalities in relation to migration status. The unequal impact of new and 
existing policies includes: NHS workers without UK citizenship paying for visas and 
to access health services (waived temporarily - Health and Social Care & Home Office, 
2020); and, ‘no recourse to public funds’ for people granted indefinite leave to remain 
in the UK (Home Office News Team, 2020; Step-Up Migrant Women Coalition, 2020). 
• The impact of public service discretion on racialised outcomes. The Runnymede Trust 
describes a vulnerability to under-estimated grades by teachers (in the absence of exams 
in 2020) among ‘higher attaining working-class students - but also particular ethnic 
minority students and specifically black Caribbean boys, as well as Gypsy Roma and 
Irish Traveller students’ (House of Commons Education Committee, 2020).  
• The alienation of target populations (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). Issues include the 




asylum seekers to hotels (Goodwin, 2020), and limited provision of controlled drugs 
and support to treat addictions (Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, 2020).  
Further, high attention by UK policymakers to race and health inequalities relates to protests 
led by the Black Lives Matter movement (BBC News, 2020c), not routine attention within 
public sector practices. 
Steps 3 and 4. Identify your values, predict the outcome of feasible 
solutions, and confront their trade-offs 
Steps 3 (identifying values) and 4 (predicting outcomes) are worth considering together 
because both contribute to the comparison of solutions. Step 3 introduces the need to make 
value-based choices to inform Step 4’s prediction and comparison of solutions. 
Policy analysis: use values and political goals to predict and compare the outcome of 
each feasible solution 
Prospective evaluation is primarily the political choice between normative criteria: 
1. Effectiveness. The size of a policy’s intended impact (Meltzer and Schwarz, 2019: 
117). 
2. Equity (fairness). The impact in terms of ‘vertical equity’ (e.g. the better off should 
pay more), ‘horizontal equity’ (e.g. couples should not pay more tax if unmarried), 
‘intergenerational’ equity (e.g. don’t impose higher costs on future populations), or in 
relation to fair processes and outcomes (2019: 118-19). 
3. Feasibility (administrative, technical). The likelihood of policy being adopted and 
implemented well (2019: 119-21). 
4. Cost (or financial feasibility). Who would bear the cost, and their willingness and 
ability to pay (2019: 122). 
5. Efficiency. To maximise the benefit while minimizing costs (2019: 122-3).  
6. The protection of human rights, human dignity, or ‘human flourishing’ (Mintrom, 
2012: 52-7). 
These values inform step 4, to ‘Assess the outcomes of the policy options in light of the criteria 
and weigh trade-offs between the advantages and disadvantages of the options’ (Meltzer and 
Schwarz, 2019: 21). Some methods – such as cost benefit analysis (CBA) – seem to dominate. 
CBA identifies the most efficient solutions by translating their predicted costs and benefits into 
a single measure, on the assumption that we can compare the experiences of individuals well, 
and that the winners from policy can compensate the losers (Weimer and Vining, 2017: 352-5, 
398-434).  
Policy process research: identify how actors cooperate or compete to define and rank 
values, and anticipate the disproportionate effect of your solution  
This process might be manageable if one policy analyst and client were involved. However, 
many analysts compete to interpret facts and predictions, find an audience, and give advice to 
different clients (Radin, 2019: 2; Brans et al, 2017). Values and goals are ambiguous and 
contested (Stone, 2012: 14). Examples include definitions of: equity, based on competing 
notions of merit and the balance between individual, communal, and state-based interventions 
(2012: 39-62), efficiency, based on who decides the main goal and if public spending is a social 
investment (2012: 63-84), need, according to measures of poverty or inequality (2012: 85-106), 




(2012: 107-28), and security, according to perceptions of threat versus experiences of harm, 
and how much risk to tolerate before state surveillance and intervention (2012: 129-53). 
Further, the connection between these abstract debates on values (step 3) and concrete 
predictions of outcomes (step 4) is not strong, because it is difficult to separate the 
consideration of one new instrument from the policy mix.   
Critical policy analysis: co-produce the rules to produce and evaluate solutions, and 
identify the impact on marginalised groups 
A common theme is to encourage forms of co-production, to produce the knowledge to inform 
debates on competing meanings and values (Bacchi, 2009; Doucet, 2019; Smith, 2012). Public 
and stakeholder involvement fosters deliberation, the ‘ownership’ of policy, public support, 
and knowledge to anticipate the consequences of policy.  
Steps 3 and 4 in practice: minimal deliberation, implicit choices 
UK policy is marked by the absence of widespread deliberation about values and trade-offs. 
Initially, the most visible trade-off related to pre-lockdown visions of freedom and security in 
relation to the risk of harm, comparing (a) freedom from state coercion versus (b) freedom 
from the harm caused by others when spreading disease. In comparison with many countries, 
UK government ministers seemed reluctant to enforce state quarantine measures (Cairney and 
Wellstead, 2020), and they were often supported by advisors (Vallance, 2020) and SAGE 
papers that warned against (a) the loss of benefits caused by school closures, and (b) the impact 
of social isolation on mental health and poverty (SPI-B meeting paper 4.3.20b: 1-4 and meeting 
14 10.3.20 in Cairney, 2020e: 9). 
Comparing the costs and benefits of lockdown 
A lockdown, and support measures, produce unequal effects (Paul Johnson. 2020a; 2020b). 
Giving priority to the lives of COVID-19 patients contributes to the deaths of others, when 
people avoid hospital for other conditions, and when the lockdown exacerbates deaths and 
chronic health problems associated with ‘poverty, unemployment and mental health problems’. 
The lockdown highlights ‘distributional choices’ since the effect of gaps in education is starker 
in state than private schools, while loss in employment is more likely among the under-25s and 
lowest-earning workers (2020a; 2020b). Further, the furlough scheme prompted more women 
than men to stop work to look after children (2020b). 
Layard et al (2020: 1) attempt to translate this impact of policy on COVID-19 deaths, other 
deaths, and ‘incomes, unemployment, mental health, public confidence and many other factors’ 
into a single metric: ‘the number of Wellbeing-Years resulting from each date of ending the 
lockdown’. They describe a ‘time to release the lockdown’ (while maintaining social distancing 
and isolating vulnerable people) when the ‘net benefits of doing so become positive’. This 
calculation is based on comparing positive and negative effects, when the lockdown release: 
‘increases people’s incomes’, ‘reduces unemployment’, ‘improves mental health, suicide, 
domestic violence, addiction, and loneliness’, ‘maintains confidence in the government’, and 
‘restores schooling’; but also ‘increases the final number of deaths’ from COVID-19 and the 
illnesses not treated by an overstretched NHS, and ‘increases road deaths, commuting, CO2 
emissions, and air pollution’ (2020:2). Based on their assumptions, a lockdown release on June 
1st would have a net, and growing, benefit to the entire population. 
Although providing only ‘rough valuations’, to prompt the UK government into performing a 




analysis under uncertainty. First, Layard et al (2020) do not identify their values or relate them 
to the unequal distribution of positive and negative effects among the UK population. Second, 
they highlight a tendency for people to avoid: putting a price on a life, confronting the trade-
offs regarding whose lives to save, and comparing the efficiency of different measures. Third, 
one key assumption underpinning Layard et al’s (2020: 18) initial calculations proved to be 
wrong: the release of lockdown did not ‘maintain confidence in the government’. High 
confidence in policy related to the perceived threat of COVID-19 and a sense of social 
solidarity, which diminished during a confusing lockdown-release with visible winners and 
losers, exacerbated by the non-resignation of Boris Johnson’s special adviser Dominic 
Cummings when found to be flouting the regulations he helped devise (Devine et al, 2020; 
Jackson et al, 2020; The Policy Institute, 2020; Cairney and Wellstead, 2020).  
Step 5. Recommend policy, taking into account what is possible, and who 
should be involved 
Policy analysis texts emphasise practical elements to recommendations: keep them simple and 
concise, tailor them to the beliefs of your audience, make a preliminary recommendation to 
inform an iterative process with clients (Meltzer and Schwartz, 2019: 212), and ‘recommend 
one policy’ (Weimer and Vining, 2017: 28). Policy process research suggests that you take into 
account the inability of governments to predict the outcomes of each instrument. Critical 
accounts emphasise the need to extend inclusive policymaking to the recommendations 
process, to anticipate the reaction of many different social groups to your proposals. However, 
the scope of COVID-19 policy is unusually wide, rendering useless the idea of a single 
recommendation. Governments necessarily use trial-and-error policymaking to adapt to 
changing circumstances.  
Trial-and-error is necessary but problematic in the UK. Studies of ‘multi-centric’ policymaking 
recommend adapting to a lack of central government control (Cairney et al, 2019). They 
criticise governments who deal with their lack of control by trying to reassert it. Policymakers 
in the UK are too driven by the idea of order: maintaining hierarchies, and producing top-down 
strategies and performance indicators to monitor and control the public sector, resulting in 
demoralising policy failure (Geyer, 2012). The alternative is to delegate decision-making, to 
rely less on targets, in favour of giving people more freedom to learn from experience. 
It is difficult to imagine the UK Government taking that advice, because Westminster systems 
encourage stories of accountability based on central government control (Cairney, 2020c). It 
pursues a different trial-and-error approach: centralising the adaptive process, while projecting 
the sense that it is in control and that policy modification is part of a consistent approach. 
Meanwhile, its critics exacerbate the problem by focusing on the actions of a small number of 
people ostensibly in power, using the language of poor judgement, incompetence, or U-turns.   
Discussion and conclusion: questions to aid future reflection 
Clearly there should be a sustained and intense period of reflection on the UK government’s 
COVID-19 policies and policymaking. It will be crucial to informing new policies to anticipate 
rather than react to pandemics. It requires us to do the following. First, hold policymakers to 
account in a systematic way that does not mislead the public. Second, recognise that ‘policy 
learning’ is a political exercise (Dunlop, 2017). Third, set realistic expectations, to recognise 




attention to (a) the competence and motivations of individual policymakers, or (b) the unequal 
impact of policies on populations already marginalised by policy and society.  With these 
requirements in mind:  
1. Was the government’s overall definition of the problem appropriate?  
Much analysis of its competence relates to its focus on intervening in late March to protect 
healthcare capacity during a peak of infection, rather than taking a quicker and more 
precautionary approach. This judgement relates partly to forecasting errors, but also its 
definition of the policy problem (Cairney, 2021). Note that SAGE evidence and advice played 
an important role in UK ministerial deliberation and action. From their perspective, many 
elements of the response should only be judged while reflecting on its long-term consequences. 
This evaluation is of a different order to specific deficiencies in preparation (such as shortages 
in PPE), immediate action (such as to discharge people from hospitals to care homes without 
testing them for COVID-19), and implementation (such as an imperfect test-trace-and-isolate 
system). 
2. Did the government select the right policy mix at the right time?  
In March, the urgency of the epidemic helped change radically the political feasibility of new 
measures. The UK government initially relied on exhortation, based on voluntarism and an 
appeal to social responsibility (in a liberal democracy). Then, the ‘stay at home’ requirement 
had a major unequal impact, in relation to the income, employment, and wellbeing of different 
groups. The economic measures reinforced many income and wealth inequalities. Initial policy 
inaction had unequal consequences on social groups, including people with underlying health 
conditions, BAME populations more susceptible to mortality at work or discrimination by 
public services, care home residents, disabled people unable to receive services, non-UK 
citizens obliged to pay more to live and work while less able to access public funds, and 
populations (such as prisoners and drug users) that receive minimal public sympathy.  
3. Did the UK government make the right choices on the trade-offs between values, and what 
impacts could the government have reasonably predicted?  
Initially, the most high profile value judgement related to (a) freedom from state coercion to 
reduce infection versus freedom from the harm of infection caused by others, followed by (b) 
choices on the equitable distribution of measures to mitigate the economic and wellbeing 
consequences of lockdown, interspersed with (c) debates on fairness in relation to who is most 
willing and able to follow social distancing rules. A tendency for the UK government to project 
centralised and ‘guided by the science’ policymaking has undermined public deliberation on 
these trade-offs between policies. The latter will be crucial to debates on the trade-offs 
associated with (national, regional, and local) lockdowns and measures to anticipate and 
address pandemics in the absence of lockdown. 
4. Did the UK government combine good policy with good policymaking?  
A problem like COVID-19 requires trial-and-error policymaking on a scale that seems 
incomparable to previous experiences. It requires further reflection on how to foster transparent 
and adaptive policymaking and widespread public ownership for unprecedented policy 




central government control and (b) adversarial politics that is not conducive to consensus 
seeking and cooperation.  
These additional perspectives and questions show that too-narrow questions – such as was the 
UK government ‘following the science’? - do not help us understand the longer term 
development and wider consequences of UK COVID-19 policy.  
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